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Living up to America’s Values:




The U.S. detention system for asylum seekers is funda-
mentally flawed. These flaws reflect an underlying lack of
fairness that is inconsistent with international law and
with U.S. traditions of fairness. For instance, the initial
determination to detain an asylum seeker is not the result
of an individualized determination, but is instead manda-
tory. Subsequent parole decisions are entrusted to the INS,
which is the detaining authority, rather than to an inde-
pendent authority. In short, the system lacks the kinds of
safeguards necessary to promote due process and to guard
against unfair and arbitrary detention. Reform is possible.
The detention system for asylum seekers can be improved
so that it is consistent with the values of fairness that the
United States strives to meet.
Résumé
Le système américain de détention des demandeurs
d’asile souffre de lacunes fondamentales. Ces lacunes re-
flètent un manque d’équité sous-jacent qui est incompat-
ible avec le droit international et les traditions
américaines d’équité. Par exemple, la décision initiale de
détenir un demandeur d’asile n’est pas une décision indi-
vidualisée, mais est en fait obligatoire. Les décisions de
libérations conditionnelles sont laissées à la discrétion du
service d’immigration et de naturalisation (INS) – qui
est lui-même l’autorité détenant les prisonniers – plutôt
qu’à une autorité indépendante. Bref, le système n’est pas
doté des garanties nécessaires pour promouvoir le respect
des procédures et protéger les intéressés contre la déten-
tion injuste et arbitraire. La réforme du système est possi-
ble. Le système de détention des demandeurs d’asile peut
être amélioré afin de le rendre compatible avec les valeurs
d’équité auxquelles les États-Unis s’efforcent de se con-
former.
Introduction
After they took my statement, they put me in handcuffs. I was
very surprised by this. I remember asking one of the officers
whether it was a crime to ask for asylum. He replied: “This is
the law.” After that they brought me to a detention center in
New Jersey. I was even more surprised to be taken to a place
where they took away my clothes and gave me the uniform of a
prisoner.
T
hese are the words of a torture survivor who was
detained in the U.S. for seven months while he waited
for his asylum claim to be granted. He later explained:
I knew that asking for asylum was a right under international
law. In my country, when I used to think about international
law and human rights, the United States was the first country I
associated with those ideals. What I experienced when I arrived
here did not correspond to the vision that those outside of the
United States have of this country.1
Whether they are Christians fleeing religious persecution
in Sudan, torture survivors from Iraq, pro-democracy ac-
tivists fleeing a repressive regime in Congo, victims of
coercive population control policies in China, rape survi-
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vors from minority clans in Somalia, or gay men attacked
in Colombia because of their sexual orientation, those who
flee to the United States arrive with the belief that they have
finally reached a place where they will be safe, free, and
treated fairly. For those who seek asylum at the U.S. borders
and airports, the welcome they receive – handcuffs, shackles
and mandatory detention – can be a devastating surprise.
The hurdles facing these asylum seekers are truly daunt-
ing. Summary “expedited removal” procedures, “manda-
tory detention,” inconsistent parole practices, lack of
government-funded legal representation, and language and
translations difficulties are among the many hurdles arriv-
ing asylum seekers must navigate in their efforts to secure
refuge in the United States.
In the wake of the tragic events of September 11, these
hurdles have only multiplied. While none of the perpetra-
tors of the September 11 attacks were asylum seekers or
refugees, various measures taken by the U.S. government
that affect non-citizens in general will necessarily affect
those who seek asylum in the U.S. At the same time, new
concerns have arisen regarding the use by the U.S. Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service (INS) of its detention
and parole authority with respect to asylum seekers – with
reports of discriminatory parole policies aimed at asylum
seekers from Arab or Muslim backgrounds, and, as the
situation in Haiti has deteriorated, at asylum seekers who
have fled to the U.S. from Haiti.
The U.S. detention system for asylum seekers is vulner-
able to these and other abuses in part because of some
fundamental flaws in the system. The initial determination
to detain an asylum seeker is not the result of an individu-
alized determination, but is instead mandatory. Sub-
sequent parole decisions are entrusted to the INS, which is
the detaining authority, rather than to an independent
authority. The parole criteria for asylum seekers are set
forth in guidelines rather than in enforceable regulations.
The system does not provide for an appeal of parole denials
to an independent judicial authority. In short, the system
lacks the kinds of safeguards necessary to promote due
process and to guard against unfair and arbitrary detention.
Reform is possible. The detention system for asylum seekers
can be improved so that it is consistent with the values of
fairness that the United States strives to meet.
The U.S. System for Detaining Asylum Seekers
In 1980, the United States reversed its nearly thirty-year
policy of detaining only those non-citizens who were con-
sidered a danger to the community or flight risks.2 Instead,
it began a policy of detaining those who sought to enter the
U.S. with false or invalid documents—a situation which
faces many genuine refugees since they may be unable to
obtain travel documents from the governments that perse-
cute them or may, like the Kosovo refugees, be stripped of
their documents by their persecutors.3
This detention regime has been codified in the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996 (IIRIRA or the “1996 immigration law”), which re-
quires the “mandatory detention” of various classes of non-
citizens. The 1996 immigration law’s “expedited removal”
provisions require “mandatory detention” of all asylum
seekers who arrive in the United States without valid docu-
ments, until they pass out of the “expedited removal” proc-
ess by establishing a “credible fear of persecution” in an
interview with an INS asylum officer or a subsequent review
by an immigration judge.4 The credible fear standard is met
if there is a “significant possibility, taking into account the
credibility of the statements made by the alien in support
of the alien’s claim and such other facts as are known to the
officer, that  the alien could establish eligibility for  asy-
lum….”5
The expedited removal process itself is wrought with
serious flaws. It entrusts the decision to deport an individ-
ual who arrives with false or invalid travel documents to an
immigration inspections officer, instead of a trained immi-
gration judge. While asylum seekers are not supposed to be
deported unless they are first given a chance to prove to an
INS asylum officer that they have a “credible fear of perse-
cution,” mistakes have been made.6 The press and human
rights organizations have documented instances of mis-
taken expedited removal determinations and other abuses
relating to the conduct of the expedited removal process.
Mistakes are indeed inevitable given the summary nature
of the process and its lack of crucial safeguards.7
Shortly before the expedited removal provisions went
into effect in April 1997, the INS increased its detention
space and opened two large detention facilities to house
asylum seekers subject to the expedited removal/manda-
tory detention provisions. These two facilities, both run by
private contractors, are the two-hundred-bed facility near
JFK International Airport in Queens, New York, which is
run by Wackenhut Corrections Corporation, and the three-
hundred-bed facility near Newark International Airport in
Elizabeth, New Jersey, which is run by Correction Corpo-
ration of America. Asylum seekers are also held in other
facilities across the country, including county and local
jails.
While the expedited removal provisions of the 1996
immigration law require the detention of asylum seekers
during the expedited removal process, they do not prohibit
parole once asylum seekers have established a credible fear
of persecution and are therefore no longer subject to expe-
dited removal proceedings.8 The authority to parole arriv-
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ing asylum seekers, however, is entrusted to the detaining
authority, the INS. If the INS denies parole, that decision
cannot be appealed to an independent or judicial authority.
While immigration judges  can review INS custody  and
bond decisions with respect to various other categories of
non-citizens,9 immigration judges are precluded from re-
viewing issues relating to the detention of “arriving” aliens,
a category which includes all arriving asylum seekers.10
After the passage of the 1996 immigration law, INS
headquarters repeatedly advised local INS districts that
asylum seekers who have established a credible fear of
persecution are eligible for parole, and INS issued memo-
randa setting forth guidelines regarding the parole of asy-
lum seekers. In December 1997, the INS issued guidelines
which specifically confirmed that “[p]arole is a viable op-
tion and should be considered for aliens who meet the
credible fear standard, can establish identity and commu-
nity ties, and are not subject to any possible bars to asylum
involving violence or misconduct.”11 These guidelines were
derived from the APSO (Asylum Pre-Screening Officer)
Parole Program of the early 1990s.12 In October 1998, an-
other set of INS guidelines stated that “[a]lthough parole is
discretionary in all cases where it is available, it is INS policy
to favor release of aliens found to have credible fear of
persecution, provided that they do not pose a risk of flight
or danger to the community.”13
While the INS has issued guidelines regarding the parole
of asylum seekers, it has refused to issue regulations specifi-
cally addressing the parole of asylum seekers. In January
1996, the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights filed a
Petition for Rulemaking, requesting that the INS issue regu-
lations codifying its parole guidelines for asylum seekers. In
its Petition, the Lawyers Committee addressed in detail the
deficiencies in the implementation of the INS parole pro-
gram for asylum seekers and stressed the need for regula-
tions to ensure that the parole program would be
implemented properly and consistently.14
For years, human rights organizations, refugee advo-
cates, and the press have documented the inconsistencies
in parole practices from one INS district to another, and
have documented cases of individual asylum seekers who
have been detained for years while awaiting resolution of
their asylum cases.15
These problems are so acute that the Department of
Justice and the INS, in December 2000, issued a regulation
to “clarify” that the INS Commissioner, other officials at
INS headquarters, and regional directors are authorized to
grant parole from INS custody.16 Some INS district direc-
tors had apparently maintained that INS headquarters did
not have the authority to interfere in their parole determi-
nations.17 The fact that the Department of Justice had to
take the step of issuing a regulation simply to ensure that
INS district directors understood that the INS Commis-
sioner had authority over their parole determinations un-
derscores how deeply rooted these problems are in the
asylum detention system.
While the December 2000 regulatory change was a posi-
tive step, this change has not led to any significant improve-
ment in the asylum detention system. In fact, as discussed
below, the fundamental flaws in the system have made it
more vulnerable to abuse in the post-September 11 climate.
Significantly, the revised rule, in and of itself, does not fix
many of the underlying problems in the U.S. system for
detaining arriving asylum seekers. For instance, it did not
codify the guidelines for parole of asylum seekers into
enforceable regulations. It also left parole decisions in the
hands of the INS rather than entrusting these decisions to
independent adjudicators.
The Impact of the Detention Regime
At any time, the U.S. government detains about twenty-two
thousand non-citizens in INS detention facilities and jails,
and it has been estimated that several thousand of those
detainees are asylum seekers.18 Precise statistical informa-
tion about asylum seekers, including the number of asylum
seekers in detention, has long been difficult to obtain from
the INS. For years, in fact, the INS has been unable to
regularly provide statistical information relating to detained
asylum seekers – even in the face of a federal statute requiring
the INS to report these numbers to Congress.19
While there may be a dearth of statistical information,
there is no dearth of individual stories. The press, human
rights groups, and faith-based organizations have detailed
the harsh impact of detention on individual asylum seek-
ers.20 Particularly disturbing are the reports of lengthy de-
tentions – sometimes lasting for several years.21 In
researching the immigration detention system, the Dallas
Morning News obtained statistics revealing that over 851
non-citizens in detention had been detained for over three
years, and that 361 of these detainees were asylum seekers or
other detainees who had not been convicted of any crime.22
The San Jose Mercury News, in the course of conducting
interviews for its award-winning series on asylum, gathered
information relating to about fifty-six asylum seekers who
were detained for over one year before being granted asylum.23
The impact of detention on children has been the subject
of increasing scrutiny over the last two years.24 The intense
public interest in the case of Elian Gonzalez, a young Cuban
boy who was paroled to relatives in Miami, helped to
highlight concerns about the INS’s detention and treatment
of so many other children.25 About 5000 children have been
reported to be in INS custody; many are held in juvenile
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jails and shelters.26 Children have also been detained in
adult jails and detention facilities when the INS has mistak-
enly concluded that they are adults based on dental exami-
nations – a procedure that has been widely criticized by
medical experts and is no longer relied upon even by the
U.S. State Department.27
Detention can be particularly difficult for the many asy-
lum seekers who are survivors of rape, torture and other
traumatic experiences. Medical experts have documented
the fact that many refugees often suffer from post-trau-
matic stress disorder, major depression, or other illnesses.28
As one expert explained: “For someone who’s been tortured
and locked up in a cell as a political prisoner in their native
countries … the experience of being locked up here again
can trigger panic attacks, flashbacks.”29
The costs of detention are tremendous. The INS deten-
tion and removal budget is now over $1 billion. The INS
reportedly spends an average of $78 a day to detain a
non-citizen. To detain an asylum seeker through his or her
initial hearing before an immigration judge has been re-
ported to cost, on the average, $7259 for a single asylum
seeker. This does not include the substantial expense of
additional detention while any appeals are pending. It has
been estimated that detaining asylum seekers costs taxpay-
ers at least $42.7 million per year.30
Additional challenges in the wake of September 11
In the wake of the September 11 attacks on the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon, the difficulties facing asylum seek-
ers in the U.S. have multiplied. While none of the perpetra-
tors of the September 11 attacks were asylum seekers or
refugees, the U.S. Department of Justice has instituted a
number of measures that apply more broadly to all non-citi-
zens but will negatively affect asylum seekers as well. Of great
concern is the Department of Justice’s proposal to drastically
restrict the ability of the Board of Immigration Appeals to
review decisions of immigration judges.31 The proposal
seeks to eliminate the Board’s de novo factual review in most
cases and encourages the issuance of summary orders. Advo-
cates for refugees have roundly criticized the proposal as it
would severely undermine the asylum appellate process and
deprive asylum seekers of a meaningful appellate review.32
On December 3, 2001, the U.S. and Canada announced,
in the context of broader co-operation on a range of border
and security issues, that they will revive discussions on a
safe third-country exception to the right to apply for asy-
lum. According to the joint statement issued by the U.S. and
Canada, the safe third-country arrangement “would limit
the access of asylum seekers, under appropriate circum-
stances, to the system of only one of the two countries.”33
Such an arrangement could further limit the ability of
asylum seekers who transit through the U.S. before seeking
asylum in Canada (including asylum seekers who are de-
tained in the U.S.) to access the Canadian asylum system –
even if their only family or contacts are in Canada.34
Also troubling are a series of regulations issued by the
Department of Justice in late September and October 2001
which expand INS detention authority. One of these regu-
lations authorizes an increase in the time to charge detained
non-citizens to forty-eight hours and, in cases of undefined
“extraordinary” circumstances or an “emergency,” to some
unspecified greater “reasonable” period of time. As a result,
the INS has been given the power to detain a non-citizen
who has committed no crime – and who is not in any way
suspected to be a danger to anyone – for an unspecified
period of time without even charging the non-citizen with
an immigration violation.35 A second new regulation allows
an INS attorney to, in essence, overrule an immigration
judge’s decision to release a detainee on bond. There is no
requirement that the individual be suspected of a crime or
of terrorist activity.36
With respect to the over 1,100 non-citizens detained in
the wave of arrests following September 11, the press and
human right organizations have documented a range of
disturbing abuses including lengthy detentions without
charges, denial of access to counsel, the conduct of secret
hearings, and abusive treatment.37 These detainees are over-
whelmingly non-citizen men of Arab or Muslim back-
ground who are being held or have already been deported
based on immigration violations. While the vast majority
of these individuals are not asylum seekers, a few refugees
have been caught up in this wave of detentions.38
At the same time, the INS’s handling  of  the asylum
detention system has also raised concerns. Parole for asy-
lum seekers, already restrictive in some areas of the U.S.,
seems to have become even more restrictive in the wake of
September 11. This may be the result of a memorandum
issued by the INS in November 2001, which states that
“[d]uring the nation’s heightened security alert and until
further notice,” District Director (or other specified) ap-
proval is required in order to parole aliens or take certain
other actions. The memorandum states that: “discretion
should be applied only in cases where inadmissibility is
technical in nature (i.e., documentary or paperwork defi-
ciencies), or where the national interest, law enforcement
interests, or compelling humanitarian circumstances require
the subject’s entry in the United States ….” The memoran-
dum, however, also states that the guidance does not change
existing statutory and regulatory standards for parole.39
Particularly troubling are reports of discriminatory pa-
role practices. The press has documented cases in which
asylum seekers from Arab or Muslim backgrounds, who
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would previously have been paroled prior to September 11,
have been denied parole. For instance, two Christian
women who fled Iraq were denied parole in Miami, even
though one of the women has strong community ties,
specifically her U.S. citizen sister and U.S. legal permanent
resident mother. Another young man, whose family is also
Christian, fled forced conscription by the Iraqi regime. He
too was denied parole even though he had a U.S. citizen
brother and parents who also live in the U.S.40
Additional charges of  discriminatory parole practices
have been leveled with respect to Haitian asylum seekers.
In early December 2001, a boat bearing nearly 200 Haitian
men, women and children arrived off the coast of Florida.
In response, the INS has instituted a policy of denying
parole to Haitian asylum seekers. A lawsuit filed in March
2002 alleges that the policy discriminates against Haitians
based on their race and nationality and violates the U.S.
Constitution’s guarantees of due process and equal protec-
tion. The INS has admitted that this policy is designed to
deter other Haitian asylum seekers from fleeing to the U.S.41
The impact of these various policy and regulatory
changes on asylum seekers is significant and will become
even more significant as the Department of Justice moves
forward with additional changes. These actions, taken by
the INS and the Department of Justice in the wake of the
September  11 attacks, are  particularly  troubling in that
these actions are undermining a system that protects people
who are victims of horrific human rights abuses.
Compounding this irony is the fact that the asylum
system is replete with rigorous safeguards designed to flag
and exclude those who are a danger. The fingerprints of
every asylum applicant are taken and sent to the FBI for a
security check. The names and birth dates of applicants are
also checked against various FBI, State Department, and
CIA databases.42 Anyone who presents a risk to U.S. security
is barred from asylum, as are those who have persecuted
others or committed serious crimes.43 The INS regulations
and the INS parole guidelines specifically prohibit the pa-
role of anyone who would be barred from asylum or would
present a risk to the community.44
The Lack of Fairness in the Asylum Detention System
There are a number of fundamental flaws in the U.S. asylum
detention system. These flaws reflect an underlying lack of
fairness that is inconsistent with international law and stand-
ards and with U.S. traditions of fairness and due process.
• Detention is mandatory for all asylum seekers who
arrive without valid documents.
Genuine refugees often have no choice but to flee to safety
by using false or invalid travel documents. Many asylum
seekers – from the Jews who fled Nazi persecution using false
travel documents to the ethnic Albanians who were stripped
of their documents as they fled Kosovo – have no choice but
to flee to safety without valid travel documents.45 For in-
stance, one client of the Lawyers Committee, a young Af-
ghan woman who was persecuted by the Taliban because she
ran a school for young girls, purposefully left her identifica-
tion documents behind, knowing that if other Taliban forces
intercepted her as she fled her country, her danger would be
multiplied if they were to learn her true identity.46 Ironically,
even asylum seekers who arrive on their own valid passports
and visas that were actually issued to them by the United
States government are considered to have “invalid” travel
documents and are subject to mandatory detention if they
honestly inform U.S. officials upon their arrival that they are
planning to apply for asylum.47
Under the U.S. expedited removal law, detention is man-
datory for arriving asylum seekers who arrive without valid
travel documents, and as there is no valid visa for seeking
asylum in the U.S., any arriving asylum seeker is generally
considered to have invalid travel documents. The initial
decision to detain is automatic under the law, not providing
for individualized determinations of who should and
should not be detained.
This mandatory or automatic approach to detention is
inconsistent with international law and guidelines, which
limit restrictions on movement to cases in  which such
restrictions are necessary. Article 31 of the 1951 Refugee
Convention generally exempts refugees from being pun-
ished because of their illegal entry or presence and provides
that states shall not place restrictions on the movements of
refugees other than those that are necessary.48 In order to
ensure consistency with Article 31, the Detention Guide-
lines issued by the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR), provide that: “[D]etention should
only be resorted to in cases of necessity. The detention of
asylum-seekers who come ‘directly’ in an irregular manner
should, therefore, not be automatic nor should it be unduly
prolonged.” Indeed, the Executive Committee of the
UNHCR, of which the United States is a member, has stated
in Conclusion 44, that detention of asylum seekers “should
normally be avoided.”49
• The U.S. has failed to issue regulations specifically
addressing parole of asylum seekers; instead the
criteria are set forth in unenforceable guidelines.
As detailed above, the INS has refused to issue regulations
setting forth the criteria for paroling asylum seekers. Instead,
these criteria – which include the establishment of identity,
the existence of community ties, the satisfaction of the cred-
ible fear standard, the absence of bars to asylum involving
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violence or misconduct, and that the individual does not
pose a danger to the community – are detailed in a series of
memoranda which the INS has labeled as “guidelines.”50
As a result, the INS and its District Directors have, in effect,
been left free to ignore the guidelines. And they do. Asylum
seekers who satisfy the criteria have been denied parole. Parole
policies have varied widely between INS Districts, as have
parole rates.51 Some individual INS Districts have radically
changed their parole policies, disregarding the guidelines, and
choosing instead torefusetoparoleasylum seekers in response
to specific goals of deterring asylum seekers. For instance, the
New Jersey INS changed its parole policy in 1998, admitting
that its detention policies were premised on deterrence objec-
tives. Its parole rate dropped dramatically: from a parole rate
that was reportedly about 89 percent to a rate of about 21
percent.52 Most recently, the Florida INS district, which had
previously paroled eligible Haitian asylum seekers, began to
refuse to parole Haitian asylum seekers in an attempt to deter
additional Haitian asylum seekers from coming to the United
States.53
Thus, parole determinations in the U.S. are often based
not on whether individual asylum seekers satisfy the criteria
specified in the INS parole guidelines, but instead on vaga-
ries such as the airport the asylum seeker arrived at, the
availability of bed space in the area, and the particular
policies of individual INS District Directors. These dispari-
ties, as illustrated by the following excerpt from a Detention
Watch Network newsletter, can dramatically affect the ex-
periences of individual refugees:
Adams Bao and Hua Zhen Chen are both seeking asylum in the
United States. But their experiences in the asylum process have
been radically different. Why? One reason is a surprisingly
arbitrary one: Adams’ boat docked in New Orleans and Chen’s
plane landed in Virginia.
Adams fled Sierra Leone, where his father and sister were killed
in the civil war. He had access to one of the few alternatives to
detention in this country. As a result, while he awaits his asylum
hearing Adams is working to support himself and mastering
rare glass-blowing skills in New Orleans.
Chen was not so fortunate. After arriving at Dulles Airport
in December 1999, she spent 20 months detained in five
different jails in Virginia before INS finally released her in
late July. A native of China, Chen suffered the forced abor-
tion of her second child and fled to the United States to avoid
sterilization and imprisonment. During those 20 months
INS denied her parole three times even though Chen had
family in Ohio willing to take her in.54
Such a process is plainly arbitrary. Detention determina-
tions that are  based not  on  clear rules,  but  instead on
ever-shifting factors that are not established by law, are
arbitrary by definition. The International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which the U.S. is a
party, specifically provides in Article 9(1) that: “No one
shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds
and in accordance with such procedures as are estab-
lished by law.”55
• The initial parole decisions are made by INS detention
officers who are ill-trained and ill-equipped to make
these determinations.
Under U.S. regulations, the decision to parole an asylum
seeker is entrusted to local INS District Directors. In prac-
tice, it is typically an individual INS detention officer who
makes the initial assessment and recommendation on re-
lease. These officers are not adequately trained to make these
determinations. They are officers whose primary responsi-
bility is enforcement of the immigration laws, rather than
adjudication. Also, unlike the specially trained INS asylum
officers, these officers do not receive extensive training in
asylum law or in the human rights situations of the various
countries from which asylum seekers flee. Compounding
this difficulty is the fact that there are significant career,
budgetary, and other considerations that create incentives
for local INS district officials not to release asylum seekers
from detention.56
• Neither initial detention determinations nor reviews
of parole denials are conducted by an independent
authority. The INS, in effect, is judge and jailer with
respect to parole decisions.
Under U.S. procedures, the decision of whether or not to
parole an arriving asylum seeker is entrusted to the INS, the
same authority that is charged with seeking to detain and
deport the individual. The INS, in effect, acts as both judge
and jailer with respect to parole decisions. And, as discussed
above, when the INS denies parole to an arriving asylum
seeker, the law does not provide for an appeal of this deter-
mination to an independent or judicial authority.57
This lack of meaningful independent review of decisions
to detain asylum seekers is a clear violation of U.S. obliga-
tions under international law. Article 9(4) of the ICCPR
provides that:
Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall
be entitled to take proceedings before a court, in order that the
court may, decide without delay on the lawfulness of his deten-
tion and order his release if the detention is not lawful.58
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This provision applies to all detainees, including immigra-
tion detainees.59 The UN Human Rights Committee, in its
decision in Torres v. Finland,60 explained that Article 9(4) of
the ICCPR “envisages that the legality of detention will be
determined by a court so as to ensure a higher degree of
objectivity and independence….” In the case of A v. Austra-
lia, the UN Human Rights Committee, in finding that a
limited court review did not satisfy the requirements of
Article 9(4), emphasized that court review “must include the
possibility of ordering release, is not limited to mere com-
pliance of the detention with domestic law,” and must be “in
its effects, real and not merely formal.”61 The UNHCR De-
tention Guidelines call for procedural guarantees, when a
decision to detain is made, including “automatic review
before a judicial or administrative body independent of the
detaining authorities.”62
• U.S. law does not provide a limit on the length of time
asylum seekers may be detained.
In the United States, arriving asylum seekers are regularly
held in detention facilities or jails for months, and some-
times for years. The INS does not regularly release informa-
tion about lengthy detention of asylum seekers. In fact, as
noted above, while the INS has repeatedly failed to provide
statistical information relating to detained asylum seekers, the
press and human rights groups have documented numerous
examplesof asylum seekers who have beendetained for lengthy
periods of time.63
Neither U.S. statutes nor regulations specify a limit on
the length of time an asylum seeker may be detained while
his or her removal and asylum proceedings are pending.
But the reasoning of a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision,
which examined a statute governing the detention and
release of aliens who had already been ordered removed,
makes clear  that  indefinite  detention  raises  serious  due
process concerns under the U.S. Constitution. In Zadvydas
v. Davis, the Supreme Court ruled that the indefinite deten-
tion of aliens who had been admitted to the United States
and subsequently ordered removed  would  raise serious
concerns under the U.S. Constitution.64 The Court con-
strued the statute at issue to contain an implicit reasonable
time limitation, which citing to Congressional intent, the
Court determined to generally be a period of six months.65
The Zadvydas case involved non-citizens who had been
admitted to the United States as opposed to non-citizens
who  had  not yet gained  admission.  The latter  category
would include arriving asylum seekers who are deemed to
have not yet been admitted. The Court, noting that its
decision involved individuals who had been admitted to the
U.S., concluded that it did not need to examine the question
of the continued authority of the doctrine that has drawn a
legal distinction between non-citizens who were afforded
constitutional rights because they had “entered” the U.S.
and those non-citizens who have traditionally been af-
forded less rights because they were deemed not to have
entered the U.S. The continued viability of this legal fiction
has been questioned by some legal experts.66 The Depart-
ment of Justice, citing this distinction, has refused to rec-
ognize the applicability of the Zadvydas decision to the
detention of arriving non-citizens who have not yet been
admitted to the U.S.67
The  absence  of a limit on the length of detention is
problematic under international standards as well. In A v.
Australia, the UN Human Rights Committee recognized
that “every decision to keep a person in detention should
be open to review periodically so that the grounds justifying
detention can be assessed.”68 The UN Working Group on
Arbitrary Detention, in its Deliberation No. 5, has set forth
a number of guarantees to be considered in assessing
whether an asylum seeker’s deprivation of liberty is arbi-
trary under international law. One of these guarantees pro-
vides that: “A maximum period should be set by law and
the custody may in no case be unlimited or of excessive
length.”69
• The U.S. does not fund legal representation for
indigent asylum seekers.
The U.S. government, unlike some European and other
governments, does not provide funding for legal  repre-
sentation of asylum seekers. A study conducted by the Geor-
getown University Institute for the Study of International
Migration, which analyzed U.S. government statistics, re-
vealed that asylum seekers are four to six times more likely
to be granted asylum when they are represented. The Geor-
getown analysis also revealed that in immigration court,
more than one out of three asylum seekers lacks repre-
sentation. For detained asylum seekers, the situation is even
worse – more than twice as many detained asylum seekers
lack representation when compared with non-detained asy-
lum seekers in defensive proceedings.70 This is no surprise
as detained asylum seekers typically have less access to legal
representation, particularly as some are detained in remote
areas that are far from legal service providers.
At the same time, detained asylum seekers face greater
burdens in attempting to prove their cases. The ability of a
detained asylum seeker to gather documentation and locate
and communicate with witnesses who could corroborate
the facts of her claim is severely hampered by the very fact
of detention. Although telephones are available in detention,
she may not be able to afford a calling card or may be limited
to collect calls, which some individuals and non-profitorgani-
zations may not accept. The telephones are routinely located
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in large “pod” or “dorm” areas that may hold scores of other
detainees, so that no meaningful degree of privacy is avail-
able to make calls to counsel or potential witnesses.71 In
addition, detained asylum seekers often have little or no
meaningful access to legal materials or country condition re-
ports that are essential to the preparation of their cases.72
• The United States has not implemented nationwide
alternatives to detention for asylum seekers.
There are a number of successful models of alternatives to
detention that have been tested in the United States. These
models have demonstrated high appearance rates for asylum
seekers – ranging from 93 per cent to 96 per cent – and
significant cost savings for the U.S. government.
The most comprehensive model alternative program was
a pilot project conducted by the Vera Institute of Justice in
contract with the INS. In this pilot program, which was
called the Appearance Assistance Program, the Vera Insti-
tute supervised the release of asylum seekers and other
non-citizens. In order to be released to supervision, partici-
pants were required to report regularly in person and by
phone. Their whereabouts were monitored. Participants
were also provided with information about the conse-
quences of failing to comply with U.S. immigration laws.
Participants in a less intensive program were given reminders
of court hearings and were provided with legal information,
and referrals to lawyers, and other services.73
The Vera Institute pilot project reported a very high
appearance rate of 93 per cent for asylum seekers released
through its appearance assistance program, and also con-
cluded that the cost of supervision was 55 per cent less than
the cost of detention.74 In concluding that supervised re-
lease is more cost effective than detention for asylum seek-
ers, the Vera Institute noted that “[i]t costs the INS $3,300
to supervise each asylum seeker who appears for hearings
compared to $7300 for those detained.”75 Based on its re-
search, the Vera Institute actually concluded that: “Asylum
seekers do not need to be detained to appear for their hearings.
They also do not seem to need intensive supervision.”76
Another successful model is a project that was coordi-
nated by the Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service
(LIRS). Through that project, the INS released twenty-five
Chinese asylum seekers from detention in Ullin, Illinois, to
shelters in several communities. The community shelters
reminded participants of their hearings, scheduled check-
ins with the INS, organized transportation, and accompa-
nied asylum seekers to their appointments. In addition,
non-profit agencies also found pro bono attorneys for all
of the asylum seekers who were released to the shelters. The
project achieved a 96 per cent appearance rate.77
Despite these very successful models and the Vera Insti-
tute’s finding that asylum seekers do not need to be de-
tained, the U.S. government has not instituted a nationwide
program of alternatives to detention for asylum seekers.
While the U.S. Congress has allocated some resources (U.S.
$3 million) for alternatives to detention during fiscal 2002,
as discussed below, it not clear to what extent, if any, those
funds will be used to release from detention asylums seekers
who would otherwise have been detained.
Improving the Fairness of the U.S. Detention System
The U.S. detention system for asylum seekers can be re-
formed to improve its fairness. Indeed, some concrete im-
provements  are urgently  needed as the current system is
fundamentally unfair and fails to meet international standards.
A number of critical changes are outlined below.
• The decision to detain an asylum seeker should be
made by an appropriately trained adjudicator in an
individualized proceeding.
At a very fundamental level, the premise of the U.S. deten-
tion system must change. The U.S. system is currently based
on a requirement of “mandatory detention” for all arriving
asylum seekers. A decision to detain should instead be made
in an individualized proceeding, and detention should only
be authorized in cases in which it has been demonstrated to
be necessary.
Detention determinations should be made by trained
adjudicators who have received specialized training in a
range of areas including asylum law, country conditions,
and special issues relating to survivors of torture. Other
appropriate training would include training to assist in
assessing asylum seekers’ community ties and proof of
identity. These adjudicators should be independent of both
the INS and the Department of Justice, which are the de-
taining authorities.
In these proceedings, the asylum seeker should have the
right to be represented and to present testimony and other
evidence. Appropriate translation must be provided. If the
INS believes that an individual should be detained, the INS
should also have the opportunity to present evidence relevant
to the detention determination.
• When parole is denied, an asylum seeker should have
the opportunity to have that decision reviewed by an
independent court.
When a request for parole is denied, the asylum seeker
should have the opportunity to have that decision reviewed
by a court that is independent of the detaining authority.
This independent review is particularly important where the
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parole decision is made, as is currently the case in the U.S.,
by the detaining authority itself.
As an initial step, immigration judges should be author-
ized to review INS detention determinations relating to
arriving asylum seekers. This reform is currently included
in a bill, called the Refugee Protection Act, which has been
introduced in both the U.S. Senate and the House of Rep-
resentatives.78 The need for an independent adjudicator to
make or review parole determinations has been stressed by
a number of human rights organizations and by experts in
the field.79
One of these experts has pointed out that in the U.S.
criminal justice system, pre-trial release decisions are made
by judges – and not by the enforcement-oriented prosecut-
ing authority. Looking to the Bail Reform Act of 1984 as a
model, Professor Michele Pistone has recommended that
U.S. law be changed to take “authority over parole deci-
sion-making out of the hands of local districts and put it
into the hands of neutral immigration judges . . .”80
Ultimately, additional reforms  – such as moving the
immigration court system from the direct control of the
Department of Justice – would be necessary to ensure the
independence of immigration judges. The U.S. Commis-
sion on Immigration Reform and the National Association
of Immigration Judges have both urged that immigration
courts be removed from the Justice Department.81
• The criteria for detention and parole of asylum seekers
should be spelled out in regulations.
Congress should direct the Justice Department to issue regu-
lations providing for the release of asylum seekers who meet
the “credible fear” standard, satisfy the identity and commu-
nity ties criteria, and pose no danger to the community. The
INS should not be permitted to issue only guide-
lines—rather than regulations—specifying the criteria for
parole of asylum seekers, as this practice has repeatedly
proven insufficient to ensure accountability and compliance
by local INS districts. Experts  who have monitored the
implementation of the asylum parole guidelines have rec-
ommended just such an approach, and the Refugee Protec-
tion  Act  would require the Justice Department to issue
regulations setting forth the criteria for paroling asylum
seekers.82
• A limit on the length of detention for asylum seekers
should be prescribed.
Some limits must be placed on the length of time that an
asylum seeker may be detained while his or her asylum
proceedings are pending. These limits could be established
by regulation or by statute. Other countries have placed
limits on the length of time that asylum seekers may be
detained.83 At the very least, a decision to detain an asylum
seeker should be reviewed by an independent court on a
regular basis. Asylum seekers who are detained for longer
periods of time should be held in facilities that allow greater
outdoor access, contact visits with family and friends, Eng-
lish classes and other educational opportunities.
• The U.S. government should fund legal representation
for children and for indigent asylum seekers.
As detailed above, asylum seekers who are represented are
more likely to win their cases. In turn, asylum seekers who
are not represented (or are poorly represented) are some-
times detained for lengthy periods of time while they pursue
their appeals.
While some European and other states provide funding
for legal representation for asylum seekers,84 the U.S. does
not. The funding options for non-governmental organiza-
tions that provide legal representation to asylum seekers are
very limited. These organizations, given their lack of re-
sources, cannot come close to meeting the substantial need
for representation in asylum cases. While the U.S. govern-
ment has just announced plans to provide some limited
funding to conduct legal orientation presentations for asy-
lum seekers, this effort, while commendable, will not meet
the substantial need for legal representation in individual
asylum cases. Government funding of legal representation
would increase the number of individuals who win asylum
at an early stage, and would decrease the number of appeals
and the corresponding detention time leading to a savings
of detention costs.
The U.S. government should fund representation for
children in asylum and immigration proceedings. About
half of the roughly five thousand children in INS detention
are reportedly not represented.85 A bill, called the Unac-
companied Alien Child Protection Act, which would re-
quire that all unaccompanied children be provided with
guardians ad litem and court-appointed lawyers to identify
and defend their best interests, has been introduced in the
U.S. Congress.86
• The U.S. government should devote significant
resources to the advancement of alternatives to
detention for asylum seekers.
While the U.S. Congress has allocated $3 million for alter-
natives to detention during fiscal year 2002, it is not clear to
what extent any projects initiated with those funds will be
used to release from detention asylum seekers who would
otherwise have been detained. Given the limited amount of
funds, the INS would only be able to launch projects at a few
locations. Some of these projects will likely be designed for
immigration detainees who are not asylum seekers. In addi-
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tion, given the restrictive parole policies and resistance to
outside involvement in parole determinations that have
been evidenced by some INS districts that house significant
numbers of detained asylum seekers, there is a chance that
the INS will not make these projects available to the very
asylum seekers who are most in need of them.
The U.S. Congress should continue to fund alternatives
to detention, and should do so at a level that would ensure
the availability of alternatives to detention across the coun-
try, rather than at just a few locations. Congress should also
ensure that a significant amount of this funding is allocated
to provide alternatives to detention to asylum seekers who
would otherwise be detained.
• Asylum seekers should only be detained in appropriate
facilities.
In the U.S., detained asylum seekers are held in large immi-
grations detention facilities and in local and county jails.
Upon their arrival in the U.S. they are often handcuffed or
shackled. Their clothes are taken from them. They are given
prison uniforms to wear. Families are sometimes separated.
Asylum seekers in some facilities are denied contact visits,
even with young children. Asylum seekers have, over the
years, reported abuse and mistreatment at some of these
facilities.87 In March 2002, Haitian women detained at a jail
in Florida reported that they were not provided with ade-
quate medical care. One woman reported that she woke up
spitting blood every morning and had yet to see a doctor
after three months in detention, and two pregnant women
detainees had received no medical checks.88
Some asylum seekers have fled from torture or other
traumatic experiences. Refugees often suffer from post-
traumatic stress disorder, major depression, or other ill-
nesses.89 As experts have emphasized, detention can
exacerbate the suffering that these vulnerable individuals
face.90
When detention is used for asylum seekers, the condi-
tions of detention should be appropriate for asylum seek-
ers. Asylum seekers should not be held in criminal facilities.
As asylum seekers are not criminals, when they are de-
tained, they should generally be held in less restrictive
settings, allowed to wear their own clothing, and given
access to educational opportunities (such as English lan-
guage classes) and, for those who are survivors of rape,
torture, or other trauma, appropriate counselling.
Conclusion
The U.S. asylum detention system can be reformed. Reform-
ing the system will require committed action by the U.S.
Congress, the Department of Justice, and the INS itself. A
major step towards reform would be the passage of the
Refugee Protection Act, a bill  which would provide for
immigration judge review of parole denials, the issuance of
regulations specifying the parole criteria for asylum seekers,
and the expanded use of alternatives to detention. The
American public’s increasing concern over the U.S. govern-
ment’s treatment of asylum seekers – as evidenced by the
growing attention of religious leaders, the press, and other
citizens across the country91 – will help to make reforms
possible.
A central objective of these reforms must be to ensure
that U.S. procedures are fundamentally fair. Only then can
we ensure that those who flee to our shores seeking protec-
tion find the safety, freedom and fairness that are central to
American values.
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